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Lessons and Liabilities in Litigating
Solitary Confinement
KERAMET REITER
This Essay reviews the recent deluge of legal attention solitary
confinement has received in the United States, focusing in particular on
three legal cases: Davis v. Ayala (a U.S. Supreme Court case), Coleman v.
Taylor (a case filed and recently dismissed in a federal district court in
Illinois), and Ashker v. Brown (a settled case filed in a federal district
court in California). A close analysis of the reasoning in each of these
cases provides a framework for examining the changing landscape of
prison reform litigation in what many are heralding as a new era of
reform. Together, these cases reveal one critical, changing mechanism of
success in reform litigation: in each of the three cases, lawyers have
leveraged careful investigative reporting and collective action by prisoners
in changing not just the legal conversation, but also the public attitude
towards isolation. This reveals the growing importance of what I call
“multi-method” approaches to reform litigation. However, the reforms
being sought and implemented are, perhaps, neither so drastic nor so
sustainable as critics of solitary confinement might hope. In light of the
history of solitary confinement, three lessons have been ignored and
deserve further scrutiny: the persistence of solitary, the opacity of solitary,
and the administrative discretion governing solitary.
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Lessons and Liabilities in Litigating
Solitary Confinement
KERAMET REITER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For advocates of solitary confinement reform (and abolition), 2015
was a red-letter year. The Supreme Court, local federal courts across the
United States, and multiple federal and professional agencies scrutinized
U.S. solitary confinement practices, levied incisive criticisms, and initiated
reform dialogues. Perhaps most dramatically, in June 2015, Justice
Kennedy wrote a concurrence in Davis v. Ayala in which he explicitly
invited challenges to the types of conditions of long-term solitary
confinement in which Hector Ayala (whose death sentence the Court
upheld) had been housed for over twenty-five years.1 Just two weeks later,
three Illinois prisoners filed a class action complaint on behalf of all
50,000 prisoners in the state. The complaint alleged that all Illinois
prisoners faced “a substantial risk of receiving arbitrary, disproportionate,
harmful, and unjustified extreme isolation sentences as a result of IDOC’s
[the Illinois Department of Corrections’] policies and customs in violation
of the United States Constitution.”2 Prisoners in isolation alleged that their
conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and that the procedures for their
placement in isolation violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
due process protections of liberty interests.3 And just two months after that,
in August 2015, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation signed a sweeping settlement agreement in Ashker v. Brown,
a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of all the prisoners in the state who
had been in solitary confinement for ten years or more. Among other
things, the settlement set a strict limit of five years on any and all terms of
*
Keramet Reiter, Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology, Law & Society, and School of
Law, University of California, Irvine; Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of
California, Berkeley 2012; J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law 2009; M.A., John
Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York 2006; B.A., Harvard University 2003. I
appreciate the helpful comments and dialogues, which took place during the November 2015
Connecticut Law Review Symposium on prison reform.
1
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14
(2015).
2
Complaint at 1, 33, 46, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015).
3
Id. at 35–36.
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solitary confinement in the state.
Then, in September 2015, the Association of State Correctional
Administrators (ASCA), in collaboration with the Arthur Liman Public
Interest Program at Yale Law School, issued a report describing conditions
in “restrictive housing” (a catch-all term for various forms of isolation,
segregation, and solitary confinement) and estimating the numbers of
prisoners held in such conditions across the United States.5 In October
2015, the Bureau of Justice Statistics issued its own report attempting to
estimate the number of people in some form of “restrictive housing.”6 The
Justice report was issued in conjunction with the convening of a National
Institute of Justice topical working group on the use of administrative
segregation in the United States.7 By the end of 2015, the Marshall Project,
itself a new investigative journalism platform founded in the fall of 2014 to
“create and sustain a sense of urgency about criminal justice in America,”
reported that solitary confinement reform would be one of three key
criminal justice trends to watch in the coming year.8 Advocates of legal
reform have every reason to pay attention, but what role will litigation play
in this new reform paradigm, and how sustainable are these reforms likely
to be?
Prior to 2015, the law on solitary confinement seemed depressingly
settled. In 1995, in the first federal court case to consider the
constitutionality of long-term solitary confinement in technologically
advanced, modern supermax facilities, a notoriously liberal district court
judge in the Northern District of California upheld the constitutionality of
solitary confinement in extremely restrictive conditions of confinement,
even for indefinitely long durations.9 And in 2005, the only time the U.S.
4
Settlement Agreement at 12, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
2015) (on file with author).
5
LIMAN PROGRAM & ASS’N OF STATE CORRECTIONAL ADM’RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCALIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON ii (2015) [hereinafter
TIME-IN-CELL], https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/asca-liman_admin
istrativesegregationreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/U832-ELQA].
6
ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND
JAILS, 2011–12, at 1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5433 [https://perma.cc/W
7KS-LV37].
7
Nancy Rodriguez, Director’s Corner: Setting the Agenda for Administrative Segregation
Research, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.nij.gov/about/director/Pages/rodriguezadminstrative-segregation.aspx [http://web.archive.org/web/20151030031209/http://www.nij.gov/about
/director/Pages/rodriguez-adminstrative-segregation.aspx].
8
Mission Statement, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/about?via=nav
right#.uQlls50ha [https://perma.cc/QP3Y-LV5J] (last visited Apr. 2, 2016); Andrew Cohen, Next Year
in Criminal Justice: Three Themes That Will Trend, Three That Won’t, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 21,
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/12/21/next-year-in-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/
MSZ6-KM39].
9
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Keramet Reiter,
Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment: Deference, Discretion, and Double Bunking,
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Supreme Court considered long-term solitary confinement in supermax
facilities, the Court found that the limited procedural protections governing
placement in the Ohio State Prison (a supermax) were adequate to protect
the prisoners’ acknowledged liberty interest in not being placed there.10
The original issue in Wilkinson v. Austin, of whether the Ohio supermax
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, was resolved within the lower courts (which ordered some
reforms to existing conditions) and was not considered by the Supreme
Court.11
Incidentally, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the unanimous
court in Wilkinson.12 But Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis, along
with the statewide, class action litigation in Illinois and California,
suggested an unsettling of these precedents.
High-profile criticisms of the widespread and long-term use of solitary
confinement in the United States bubbled up over the five years prior to
Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis. In 2009, Jean Cassella and James
Ridgeway founded Solitary Watch, a web-based project to investigate
solitary confinement and consolidate resources on the topic; the site now
has hundreds of thousands of visitors per year.13 The American Civil
Liberties Union founded a national Stop Solitary campaign in 2012,14
following on the heels of the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s explicit
condemnation, in 2011, of any term in solitary confinement lasting longer
than fifteen days.15 In 2011 and again in 2013, tens of thousands of
California prisoners participated in hunger strikes, explicitly protesting
conditions in solitary confinement.16 In 2012 and 2014, Democratic
Senator Dick Durbin hosted two congressional hearings critically
evaluating the practice of solitary confinement throughout U.S. prisons. 17
1986–2010, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 89, 93 (2015) (discussing Madrid v. Gomez and its impact on
subsequent cases).
10
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005); see also Keramet Reiter, The Most Restrictive
Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons, 1960–2006, 57 STUD. L.
POL. & SOC’Y 71, 114–15 (2012).
11
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 218.
12
Id. at 212.
13
See SOLITARY WATCH, http://solitarywatch.com/ [http://web.archive.org/web/2016041416023
9/http://solitarywatch.com/] (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
14
See We Can Stop Solitary, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/feature/we-canstop-solitary?redirect=stop-solitary-resources-advocates [https://perma.cc/4ES8-W6RH] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2016).
15
Solitary Confinement Should Be Banned in Most Cases, UN Expert Says, U.N. NEWS CENTRE
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40097 [https://perma.cc/PC5H-UR
AC].
16
Keramet Reiter, The Pelican Bay Hunger Strike: Resistance Within the Structural Constraints
of a US Supermax Prison, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 579, 579–81 (2014).
17
See Durbin Commends President Obama's Leadership in Addressing Solitary Confinement,
U.S. SEN. DICK DURBIN (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin
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Even in late 2014, however, the conversation about solitary confinement
was primarily political. That changed in 2015, when large-scale litigation
about conditions of solitary confinement suddenly seemed viable.
The three 2015 federal cases of Davis v. Ayala, Coleman v. Taylor, and
Ashker v. Brown together signal the possibility for sweeping legal
reconsiderations of the practice of solitary confinement, especially in its
longer-term iterations, across the United States. A close analysis of the
context in which each case arose and of the reasoning underlying the
litigation, settlement, and opinions in these cases, provides a framework
for examining the changing landscape of prison reform litigation in what
many are heralding as a new era of reform.18 Together, these cases reveal
critical, changing mechanisms of success in reform litigation. In each of
the three cases, empirical scholarship, careful investigative reporting, and
even collective action by prisoners, have been integral parts of the
litigation and legal reasoning underlying the cases. This exemplifies the
growing importance of what I call “multi-method” approaches to reform
litigation. However, the reforms Justice Kennedy called for in Davis, the
ones being sought in Coleman, and the ones being implemented in Ashker,
are, perhaps, neither so drastic nor so sustainable as critics of solitary
confinement might hope. In light of the history of solitary confinement,
each of these cases ignores three lessons, which deserve further scrutiny:
the persistence of solitary, the opacity of solitary, and the administrative
discretion governing solitary.
In the first three parts of this Essay, I introduce each of the three
landmark 2015 cases and analyze the context for and reasoning in each,
identifying the multi-method approaches along with the historical blind
spots visible between the lines of the legal reasoning. In the fourth part, I
summarize the “lost lessons” of prior reform and suggest how they might
be better incorporated into future litigation efforts.

-commends-president-obamas-leadership-in-addressing-solitary-confinement [https://perma.cc/FB8SPLTM] (detailing Senator Durbin’s condemnation of solitary confinement in two hearings as Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights).
18
See, e.g., Eli Hager & Gerald Rich, Shifting Away from Solitary: More States Have Passed
Solitary Confinement Reforms This Year than in the Past 16 Years, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 23,
2014), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/23/shifting-away-from-solitary [https://perma.cc/
V4SV-6GDM] (documenting the substantial increase in solitary confinement reforms in 2014 when
compared to the sixteen years prior); see also David M. Shapiro, To Seek a Newer World: Prisoners’
Rights at the Frontier, 114 MICH. L. REV. 124 (2016).
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II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S INVITATION TO A BEHEADING

19

In Davis v. Ayala, Justice Kennedy wrote a short concurrence to the
majority opinion upholding Hector Ayala’s death sentence, which
Kennedy was “unqualified” in supporting.20 In his concurrence, however,
Justice Kennedy outlined his response to “one factual circumstance,
mentioned at oral argument but with no direct bearing on the precise legal
question presented by this case.”21 Appending this kind of commentary
with “no direct bearing” on the case at hand was unusual enough, but the
substance of the commentary was even more surprising. In a short but
sweeping three-page review, Justice Kennedy summarized the existing
evidence in literature, law, and science that solitary confinement “exact[s]
a terrible price” from inciting a “mindless state” to “terror” to “anxiety,
panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and suicidal thoughts
and behaviors.”22 Justice Kennedy concluded with an invitation to
prisoners and their advocates to bring a case to challenge (or even behead)
This is a riff on Vladimir Nabokov’s classic novel, INVITATION TO A BEHEADING (Dmitri
Nabokov trans., Vintage Int’l 1989) (1959) (raising the irrationality of the death penalty as a
punishment). This reference to Nabokov’s novel as a relevant metaphor for thinking about the secrecy
and irrationality of extreme punishments builds on the work of Michael Mushlin, who argues that Franz
Kafka’s classic work In the Penal Colony provides another helpful metaphor for thinking about the
challenges to reform, especially where bureaucrats lack the power to implement reforms, and punitive
institutions remain closed off to public oversight. Michael B. Mushlin, “I Am Opposed to This
Procedure”: How Kafka’s In the Penal Colony Illuminates the Current Debate About Solitary
Confinement and Oversight of American Prisons, 93 OR. L. REV. 571, 625–26 (2015).
20
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14
(2015). The central question in Davis concerned the constitutionality of the decades-old death sentence
of Hector Ayala. In 1985, Hector Ayala, along with his older brother Ronaldo Ayala, was charged with
murdering three men in a San Diego auto body shop, as part of a robbery. In 1989, in separate trials,
both brothers were convicted and sentenced to death. ‘Executioner’ of 3 Given Death Sentence, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-10/local/me-2458_1_death-sentence [https:/
/perma.cc/LK4L-HAX2]. At Hector Ayala’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike
all seven of the eligible African-American and Hispanic jurors in the jury pool. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at
2193–94. Hector Ayala litigated the racially disparate impact of these challenges for the next quarter of
a century; in the spring of 2015, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case. Id. at 2187. In June of
2015, Justice Alito delivered the 5-4 opinion of the Court: any constitutional error that took place as a
result of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges to strike all the minority jurors was “harmless.” Id. at
2208. The decision reaffirmed the extremely high standard prisoners must meet in order to prove
constitutional error in an appeal of a death penalty proceeding (and severely limited the Court’s 1986
holding in Batson v. Kentucky, which had restricted lawyers’ abilities to use peremptory challenges in
apparently racially biased patterns). See Hadar Aviram, Davis v. Ayala: Post-Conviction Review of
Batson, Harmless Error, and a Surprising Dignity Opinion from Justice Kennedy, PRAWFSBLAWG
(June 18, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/week25/ [https://perma.cc/T2VYX4AH], for an analysis of this aspect of the case. Put simply, the holding, supported by the Court’s five
Republican-appointed justices, sided with the interests of the California courts and prosecutors, and
against the interests of the death-sentenced prisoner. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion.
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 2210.
19
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the practice of solitary confinement: “In a case that presented the issue, the
judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to
determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term confinement
exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt
them.”23 Such an invitation deserves careful scrutiny. What kind of case
might “present the issue” of whether long-term solitary confinement is
constitutional, and what kind of “alternatives” might be “required”?
The evidence Justice Kennedy presents in his concurrence, as well as
the context in which Davis arose, provide two important insights into the
kinds of cases that might viably challenge the constitutionality of solitary
confinement and produce a judicial requirement for the implementation of
alternatives. First, multi-method approaches will be required to bring a
case. Second, the history of prior litigation (including litigation in which
Kennedy himself issued opinions) deserves more attention and
incorporation into future litigation strategies.
The sheer range of sources Justice Kennedy references in critiquing
solitary confinement suggests that any challenge to the practice of solitary
confinement will necessarily need to mobilize and analyze a wide array of
expert evidence from history, science, and even the popular media. In two
concise paragraphs in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy reviews the history
of solitary confinement: feared in the 1770s in England; characterized as
permanently, psychologically damaging in popular literature—like
Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities—in the mid-nineteenth century; condemned
as worse than a sentence to death by the U.S. Supreme Court in In re
Medley in 1890; and criticized by scholars from nearly every discipline
from law to medicine throughout the twentieth century.24 Later in the
concurrence, Justice Kennedy describes “a new and growing
awareness . . . of the subject . . . of solitary confinement,” as exemplified,
he suggests, by a New Yorker story about Kalief Browder.25 Browder, who
was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest, spent two years in solitary
confinement on New York City’s Riker’s Island jail, pre-trial.26 He was
ultimately released, but he committed suicide one year later.27
This concise survey of the state of knowledge about solitary
confinement over time reveals that reforming the conditions of
23

Id. at 2209.
Id. at 2210.
25
Id.
26
See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015)
[hereinafter Gonnerman, Kalief Browder], http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder
-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/D8QH-KVBW] (recounting the arrest and imprisonment of Browder in
New York); see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014, at 26
(providing a detailed account of Browder’s experience on Rikers Island and the pre-trial events that
ultimately led to his release after all charges against him were dropped).
27
Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, supra note 26.
24
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confinement will require something more than a “case that presents the
issue” of solitary confinement to the court. The social science evidence
from doctors as well as from “penology and psychology experts”28 about
the detrimental effects of solitary confinement, in addition to the
investigative reports into horrific individual experiences in solitary
confinement, will be vital pieces of any case presentation, just as they are
vital pieces of Kennedy’s argument in his concurrence.
While Justice Kennedy suggests that some of this evidence about the
detrimental effects of solitary confinement is new, he implicitly
acknowledges that some of it has existed since the first prisons opened in
the United States, in the early nineteenth century.29 A particular challenge
of any new case confronting the practice of solitary confinement, therefore,
will be reframing and integrating old and new evidence in a way that
accounts for the persistence of solitary confinement as a correctional
practice. While details of the practice have changed—such as the size of
and conditions in isolation cells, the lengths of time spent in isolation, and
the reasons for being sent to isolation—solitary confinement has existed in
some form in every prison system in America, from the first penitentiaries
in Philadelphia and Auburn, to the most modern facilities in California,
Colorado, and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.30 Litigation, then, must account for
the persistence of solitary confinement.
Kennedy’s own concurrence reveals, and indeed perpetuates, two
mechanisms of this persistence: lack of transparency and deference to
prison administrators. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy indirectly
acknowledges the opacity of prisons, noting that, after sentencing,
“[p]risoners are shut away—out of sight, out of mind.”31 But Justice
Kennedy mistakenly equates this opacity with a lack of attention on the
part of lawyers and judges to conditions of confinement: “[T]he public
may have assumed lawyers and judges were engaged in a careful
assessment of correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges
assumed these matters were for the policymakers and correctional

28

Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 2209.
30
For an analysis of the use of solitary confinement in early penitentiaries, see generally
REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, at 37, 56 (2008) (discussing the uses of solitary confinement
in the Walnut Street prison (Penn.) and Auburn (N.Y.) throughout the 1700s and 1800s); MICHAEL
MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN
PHILADELPHIA, 1760–1835, at 193–96, 294–95 (1996) (discussing Walnut Street prison in addition to
Eastern State penitentiary); Ashley Rubin, A Neo-Institutional Account of Prison Diffusion, 49 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 365, 368–70 (2015) (referencing prior research such as McLennan and Meranze). For an
analysis of the persistence of the practice in modern facilities, see Reiter, supra note 10, at 78
(beginning with an analysis of the Walnut Street prison, founded in 1780s Pennsylvania).
31
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29

1176

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1167

experts.” To say that lawyers and judges have “assumed” correctional
policies were for policymakers and experts is to ignore both the long
history of litigation in the United States challenging exactly this point,33 as
well as the frequency with which judges have paid attention to correctional
policies and found them perfectly acceptable.34
Justice Thomas argues exactly this point in his own Davis concurrence,
indicating that he has paid attention to the conditions of confinement in
which Hector Ayala is being held, and found them to be perfectly
constitutional—“a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims,
Ernesto Dominguez Mendez, Marcos Antonio Zamora, and Jose Luis
Rositas, now rest.”35 Moreover, in Kennedy’s concurrence, describing the
conditions of solitary confinement Hector Ayala “likely” experienced, he
cites his own majority opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin, a case in which
lawyers and judges alike engaged in a “careful assessment” of correctional
policies governing solitary confinement in Ohio’s supermax.36 Wilkinson,
in fact, is an example of another case in which judges ultimately found that
conditions in solitary confinement were perfectly acceptable.37 The
problem, then, is not a lack of close legal attention to correctional policies,
but rather the fact that these policies have withstood legal reform efforts.
One reason why the policies have remained resistant to reform is
apparent in both Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis and in his earlier opinion
in Wilkinson: judges evaluating conditions of confinement tend to defer to
prison administrators, who claim that potentially unconstitutional
conditions of confinement are necessary to maintain institutional safety
32

32

Id. at 2209–10.
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 34, 37 (1998) (describing a change in
judicial reform in the 1960s); see also Reiter, supra note 10, at 73–74 (examining how courts addressed
the constitutionality of solitary confinement before supermax prisons were built and then in the two
decades after the first supermaxes were built).
34
See, e.g., COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 27–33 (2007) (discussing the
Court’s deference to legislative “intent” in laws challenged by Eighth Amendment claims); Sharon
Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009)
(arguing that courts look to the crime itself when determining if a state was cruel in the punishment it
handed down); Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, FED. SENTENCING REP., Apr.
2012, at 245, 245 [hereinafter Dolovich, Forms of Deference] (addressing deference to state actors
because their job is complex); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (2006) (addressing the refusal by courts to
guarantee constitutional rights because of lacking “judicially manageable standards”); Giovanna Shay,
Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 331–32 (2010) (arguing that jail and prison
regulatory exemptions from federal and state Administrative Procedures Acts create spheres of
expanded discretion for jail and prison administrators).
35
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring).
36
Id. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 218 (2005))
(additional citations omitted).
37
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 213 (holding that Ohio’s New Policy for classifying prisoners in
supermax prisons complied with the Due Process Clause).
33
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38

and security. Kennedy himself acknowledges the need for exactly this
deference in his Davis concurrence: “Of course, prison officials must have
discretion to decide that in some instances temporary, solitary confinement
is a useful or necessary means to impose discipline and to protect prison
employees and other inmates.”39 With the phrase “of course,” Kennedy
assumes the need for discretion, but he also suggests that the discretion to
place a prisoner in solitary confinement should be constrained within terms
that are “temporary” (presumably as opposed to “long-term”). But
Kennedy does not specify a definitional duration for “temporary.”
The history of solitary confinement in the United States suggests that
“temporary” isolation readily becomes long term and semi-permanent,
especially when prison officials define the conditions under which
isolation is necessary.40 In fact, throughout the 1970s, California prison
officials faced challenges to the conditions of solitary confinement in the
exact Adjustment Center unit in San Quentin where Hector Ayala has been
in solitary confinement for the past twenty-five years.41 Although federal
courts in California ordered substantial reforms to the conditions of
confinement at the Adjustment Center in the 1970s, it remains in operation
38
See Dolovich, Forms of Deference, supra note 34, at 246 (“[D]eference to prison officials is
written right into the substantive constitutional standards.”); Reiter, supra note 9, at 93 (“U.S. federal
courts have held that supermaxes are necessary tools of safety and security, based on the assertions of
prison administrators that this is the case.”).
39
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40
See Keramet Reiter, Reclaiming the Power to Punish: Legislating and Administrating the
California Supermax, 1982–1989, LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming) (discussing the extended
lockdowns used in California prisons in the 1970s and institutionalized in the 1980s). For other
discussions of extended lockdowns, see Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1422 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (challenging extended lockdowns in California in the 1970s and 1980s through permanent
injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 801 F.2d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 1986); Adams v. Carlson, 352 F.
Supp. 882, 886 (E.D. Ill.) (challenging extended lockdowns in Illinois in the 1970s), vacated, 488 F.2d
619 (7th Cir. 1973); DAN BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION: BLACK PRISON ORGANIZING IN THE RADICAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 100–01 (2014) (referencing extended lockdown as a prison condition that led to
uprising of black prisoners); MIKE FITZGERALD, CONTROL UNITS AND THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
(1975).
41
See Reiter, supra note 40 (discussing litigation around extended lockdowns). For references to
the conditions in San Quentin’s Adjustment Center and Ayala’s housing status there, see Tamar
Birckhead, Prisoners in Isolation: In Davis v. Ayala, Justice Anthony Kennedy Issues a Call to Action
in His Discussion of Solitary Confinement, JUV. JUST. BLOG (July 8, 2015), http://juvenilejustice
blog.web.unc.edu/2015/07/08/prisoners-in-isolation-in-davis-v-ayala-justice-anthony-kennedy-issues-a
-call-to-action-in-his-discussion-of-solitary-confinement/ [https://perma.cc/SNV5-YTZA] (describing
exchange between Justice Kennedy and Ayala’s lawyer Anthony Dain about Ayala’s conditions of
confinement in “administrative segregation”); Nancy Mullane, The Adjustment Center: Where No One
Wants to Go, KALW LOC. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 22, 2012), http://kalw.org/post/adjustment-center-whereno-one-wants-go [https://perma.cc/85VK-HTZV] (describing conditions in and the history of the
Adjustment Center); San Quentin Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY, https://prisoner
hungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/education/the-prisoners-demands-2/demands-across-the-system/s
an-quentin-demands/ [https://perma.cc/F86N-8D6F] (presenting open letter signed by Hector Ayala to
San Quentin officials describing conditions in the Adjustment Center, where Ayala is housed).
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42

more than three decades later. The San Quentin Adjustment Center, then,
stands as an example of the fact that lawyers and judges have paid
attention to conditions of solitary confinement, but that this attention has
resulted in neither elimination of solitary confinement nor the imposition
of constraints to make the isolation “temporary.”
Solitary confinement has not only persisted in spite of litigation, it has
expanded, with few ameliorations to the harsh conditions that have
characterized segregation for decades. During oral arguments in Davis, in
the spring of 2015, Justice Kennedy asked Ayala’s attorney, Anthony
Dain, about the conditions in San Quentin’s Adjustment Center. Dain
explained: “It’s a 150-year-old prison and their administrative segregation
is single cells, a very old system, very small . . . .”43 Dain elaborated,
describing Ayala’s conditions of confinement: “When I visit him, I visit
him through glass and wire bars . . . . It is a single cell. . . . You are allowed
one hour a day [outside the cell].”44 Hector Ayala’s conditions of
confinement are an example of the persistence of solitary confinement in
both “very old” and “very small” forms as well as in more modern and
relatively spacious forms. Notably, only 102 of California’s 746 death-row
prisoners are housed in solitary confinement in San Quentin’s Death Row
Adjustment Center.45
By contrast, more than 3,000 other prisoners in California are held in
other forms of long-term solitary confinement for terms ranging from a
few months to more than forty years.46 These 3,000-plus prisoners are
housed in modern supermax facilities, which were built in California in the
late 1980s in order to meet minimum space requirements (eighty square
feet), to provide adequate lighting (fluorescent lights remain on twentyfour hours per day), and to guarantee an average of an hour per day out-ofcell time (each eight cells are linked to one exercise yard, called a “dog
42
See Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 539–40 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
600 F.2d 189, 189–90 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing cruel and unusual characteristics of conditions for a
class of seven plaintiffs).
43
Birckhead, supra note 41. Contrary to Dain’s implication about the age of the Adjustment
Center, the isolation facility itself is relatively new within San Quentin; it was built in 1960. Mullane,
supra note 41.
44
Mark Joseph Stern, 20 Years in a Windowless Cell, SLATE (June 19, 2015), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/06/supreme_court_and_solitary_confinement_justi
ce_anthony_kennedy_finds_it.html [https://perma.cc/SQW6-62HL].
45
DIV. OF ADULT OPERATIONS, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DEATH ROW TRACKING
SYSTEM: CONDEMNED INMATE LIST (2016), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/capital_punishment/docs/condemn
edinmatelistsecure.pdf [https://perma.cc/28R5-GCQG]; Howard Mintz, San Quentin: Inside
California's Death Row, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/cri
me-courts/ci_29323310/inside-californias-death-row [https://perma.cc/MAC6-LH64].
46
Keramet Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die: California’s Supermax Prisons and Prisoners, 1987–
2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 530, 531 (2012); Ian Lovett, California Agrees to Overhaul Use of
Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/solitaryconfinement-california-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/H58L-X7NJ].
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run”). In California, up until the settlement in Ashker, further discussed
below, more than 2,000 state prisoners were held in solitary confinement
indefinitely because of their alleged status as gang members, not because of
a specific disciplinary violation.48
Ayala, then, is an exception among death row prisoners for being in
solitary confinement, and he is an exception among prisoners in solitary
confinement for being housed in a small, old isolation unit, built half a
century ago. If the Supreme Court (or any lower court) were to reconsider
Ayala’s conditions of confinement specifically, any recommended reforms
could be limited in a variety of ways: to death row prisoners, to cells built
more than twenty-five years ago, or to prisoners who have spent more than
ten years, or more than twenty years, in isolation.
The fact that the Supreme Court even took notice of Hector Ayala’s
conditions of confinement depended on Ayala’s exceptional circumstances
as a death-sentenced prisoner in a state that guarantees such prisoners legal
representation at each stage of the appellate process. Across the United
States, there are just under 3,000 death-sentenced prisoners, and only a
small fraction of these are housed in long-term solitary confinement in
conditions like Ayala’s.49 By contrast, as many as 300,000 prisoners (one
in every five) across the United States spent time in some form of isolated
confinement in 2012.50 Although data about this population has not yet
been systematically collected, preliminary reports suggest that, in some
states and some prison facilities, the average lengths of such stays in
isolation can be as long as two to three years.51 In sum, then, the universe
of cases in which a prisoner is represented by an attorney and gets a
47

47

Reiter, supra note 46, at 531.
Id. at 542.
49
As of January 2016, there were 2,943 prisoners under sentence of death in the United States.
Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/deathrow-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year [https://perma.cc/2WMR-N5DS] (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
The exact number of death-sentenced prisoners in solitary confinement is unknown; conditions vary by
state and are not carefully tracked. In general, however, prisoners on death row have more privileges
than prisoners in solitary confinement. For instance, death row prisoners, unlike solitary confinement
prisoners, can usually socialize on “group” exercise yards, make phone calls, visit the law library
regularly, and even, in some cases, send e-mails. See, e.g., Harrison Jacobs, What It’s Like Inside the
Terrifying Super-max Prison Where the Boston Bomber Is Expected to Be Executed, BUS. INSIDER
(May 15, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-super-max-prison-where-the-boston-bomber-willbe-executed-is-known-as-guantanamo-north-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/THG5-6T42].
50
See BECK, supra note 6, at 1 (showing varying demographics of prisoners, at least twenty
percent of whom spent time in isolated confinement in 2012).
51
See TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 5, at 28 (“The two jurisdictions reporting the largest percentages
of prisoners held in long-term segregation were the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which held 58% of the
prisoners in administrative segregation at ADX Florence (234 out of 404 prisoners) for more than 3
years, and Pennsylvania, which held 45% of the prisoners in administrative segregation at SCI Greene
(123 out of 271 prisoners) for more than 3 continuous years.”); Reiter, supra note 46, at 548 (showing
that the average length of stay in the SHU at Pelican Bay was over two years in 2007).
48
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hearing in the Supreme Court, such that the issue of solitary confinement
can even be “presented,” is vastly smaller than the total number of
prisoners in long-term solitary confinement across the United States. Most
prisoners in isolation (but not under sentence of death) have no right to a
lawyer, no opportunity to put their claims before an appellate court, and
therefore no chance to describe their conditions of confinement to Justice
Kennedy.52
Even when such a case was presented to the Supreme Court, a few
months after the publication of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis,
the Court declined to hear the case.53 In Prieto v. Clarke, Alfred Prieto, one
of only eight prisoners then sentenced to death in Virginia, challenged the
harsh conditions of his permanent solitary confinement and sought a right
to have his automatic assignment (as a death-sentenced prisoner) to those
harsh conditions reviewed (and presumably reconsidered) within the prison
system.54 Alfred Prieto’s case seemed as analogous to Hector Ayala’s as
possible: a death-sentenced prisoner, held for years (seven) in solitary
confinement, in conditions only a minority of state prisoners experienced.
Moreover, Prieto sought a moderate alternative: rather than seeking the
abolition of solitary confinement, he sought more due process protections
governing his assignment to solitary confinement.55 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied Prieto’s request, and Prieto appealed to the
Supreme Court. On October 1, 2015, while Prieto’s appeal was pending,
the state of Virginia executed him.56 On October 13, the Supreme Court
dismissed his petition as moot.57
Prieto’s case confirms the myriad challenges any one prisoner, even
one with a lawyer and a right to appeal, will face in actually presenting the
issue of the constitutionality of long-term solitary confinement to the
Supreme Court. Moreover, even if Justice Kennedy wants to consider such
a case, he is likely in the minority. In Davis, even while he invited a case
that would seek to eliminate (or at least ameliorate) Hector Ayala’s harsh
52

For a review of the obstacles non-death sentenced prisoners face in bringing challenges to the
conditions of their confinement, see Keramet Reiter, Making Windows in Walls: Strategies for Prison
Research, 20 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 417, 422 (2014).
53
Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 319 (2015).
54
Id. at 247.
55
Id.
56
Tom Jackman, Triple Murderer Alfredo Prieto Is Executed in Virginia, WASH. POST (Oct. 1,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-allows-execution-of-alfredo-prietoto-proceed/2015/10/01/eaec9f28-67c6-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html [https://perma.cc/PD7KVSJ6].
57
Prieto, 136 S. Ct. at 319. For an analysis of the case, see Robert Barnes, If Kennedy Is Looking
for a Solitary Confinement Case, an Inmate Has One, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2015), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/if-kennedy-is-looking-for-a-solitary-confinement-case-an-inmatehas-one/2015/08/09/b59a6444-3e0a-11e5-b3ac-8a79bc44e5e2_story.html [https://perma.cc/64CH-GG
DA].
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conditions of confinement in long-term isolation, Justice Kennedy joined
Justice Alito’s majority opinion, which literally invited the execution of
Ayala. Justice Kennedy does not acknowledge the incoherence, but Justice
Thomas does. In what Steve Vladek described as a “curt” paragraph,58
Justice Thomas wrote: “[T]he accommodations in which Ayala is housed
are a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims . . . now rest.
And . . . Ayala will soon have had as much or more time to enjoy those
accommodations as his victims had time to enjoy this Earth.”59 Thomas’s
dissent is a reminder that reform of solitary will face many challenges, not
least among them the perspective that the prisoners therein deserve nothing
better.
By October of 2015, after the Supreme Court dismissed Alfred Prieto’s
case, advocates wondered whether Justice Kennedy’s “invitation to a
beheading” of the practice of long-term solitary confinement was hollow.
After all, what case could have presented a more precise question than
Prieto’s? This Part has suggested that, even had the Court accepted Prieto’s
case, explicitly considered his conditions of confinement, and ordered
reforms, solitary confinement might yet persist.
Still, other prisoners and their advocates mobilized in 2015 to
challenge the conditions of long-term solitary confinement at the state
level. Two cases—one in Illinois and one in California—reiterate the
themes visible in Davis: multi-method approaches bring challenges to
long-term solitary confinement to the attention of the judiciary, but the
persistence of solitary confinement, the opacity of the practice, and judicial
deference to prison officials interact to undermine reform efforts.
III. ILLINOIS PRISONERS RESPOND TO THE
INVITATION AND “PRESENT THE ISSUE”
On June 24, 2015, lawyers in Chicago, Illinois filed a sweeping class
action complaint on behalf of “all individuals who have been or are
currently transferred from general prison population into segregation” (in
other words, all state prisoners): Coleman v. Taylor.60 The Complaint
alleged that solitary confinement, or “extreme isolation,” is imposed on
prisoners in Illinois for “long and severely harmful” durations, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
58
Steve Vladek, Opinion Analysis: How Habeas Courts Should Assess Harmless Error in a
Procedural Batson Challenge, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/
opinion-analysis-how-habeas-courts-should-assess-harmless-error-in-a-procedural-batson-challenge/
[https://perma.cc/47RS-95GS].
59
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14
(2015).
60
Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Coleman v. Taylor, No.
1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
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punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.61
The Complaint sought the implementation of new rules governing
prisoners’ placement in solitary confinement, based on standards
promulgated by the American Bar Association for the Treatment of
Prisoners, including: using the least restrictive conditions of confinement
necessary for the shortest possible duration; implementing individualized
determinations of dangerousness prior to placement in solitary
confinement; and prohibiting the placement of prisoners with serious
mental illness in long-term solitary confinement.62
In a sense, this complaint responded directly to Justice Kennedy’s
invitation in his Davis concurrence, issued just a week earlier. Just as with
Kennedy’s “multi-method” critique of solitary confinement, Coleman
relied on a multi-method litigation approach: building on the momentum of
a successful grassroots effort to close the state’s highest security prison in
2014, drawing on the findings of an independent non-profit’s (the Vera
Institute of Justice) analysis of the use of solitary confinement throughout
the Illinois Department of Corrections in 2011,63 referencing scientific
research about the mental health impacts of solitary confinement,
incorporating legal references (including Kennedy’s) into the Complaint,
and relying on national and international standards governing solitary
confinement.64 A simple legal argument about Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations would have been inadequate for the Complaint, in
part because Illinois’ solitary confinement units, like California’s
Adjustment Center, had previously faced, and survived, litigation in the
1970s and 2000s.65
Illinois, in fact, had a long history of continuing to use solitary
confinement—even expanding its use—in the face of criticisms of the
practice. In the 2000s, the debates focused on Tamms Correctional Center,
a supermax opened in 1995, designed explicitly for long-term solitary
confinement, and the highest security prison in Illinois. From the day the
facility opened, it faced widespread public scrutiny, including a class
action lawsuit and a sustained public campaign, coordinated by family
members of Tamms prisoners and activists in the Chicago area, to close the
61

Id. at 5.
Id. at 37–45.
63
Id. at Exhibit E, ECF No. 1-1.
64
Id. at 6–8.
65
See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
Due Process Clause is applicable to the revocation of statutory good time credits and punitive
segregation in inter-prison administrative actions); Black v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 856, 858 (N.D. Ill.
1981), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 688 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1982); Reiter, supra note 10, at 97–99; see
also Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 590 (7th Cir. 2005) (addressing challenges to conditions and
policies at Tamms, Illinois’ supermax prison that maintained prisoners in long-term solitary
confinement until it closed in January 2013).
62
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66

institution. On January 4, 2013, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn shut down
Tamms Correctional Center, through a budget line item eliminating
funding for the institution.67 Until January 2013, Tamms was home to 168
prisoners. When Tamms closed, these prisoners were quickly transferred to
other facilities throughout the state; however, most remained in some form
of solitary confinement.68 Between June of 2012 and June of 2013, Illinois’
solitary confinement population actually increased by a total of 257
prisoners, in spite of the closure of the state’s supermax.69
These 2012 and 2013 population reports supplemented data provided
in an independent evaluation, conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice
and published in 2011. Much of the Coleman Complaint relied on evidence
from this Vera Institute study, which documented disproportionately long
stays in solitary confinement, conditions in solitary confinement units that
were “not acceptable with respect to recreation, showers, mental health
treatment, or contacts with clinical-services staff,” and inconsistent
implementation of isolation policies across the state prison system.70 The
Coleman plaintiffs’ reliance on information gleaned from this independent
study of the Illinois prison system—rather than on any data regularly
collected, or publicly available, in the state—reveals just how opaque
solitary confinement units are. This opacity, in turn, echoes Justice
Kennedy’s statement in his Davis concurrence that prisoners are “shut
away—out of sight, out of mind” and exposes how critical transparency is
to prisoners’ and lawyers’ abilities to even articulate a claim about
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in isolation units.
In August of 2015, the Illinois Attorney General filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Coleman claims.71 In the reply in support of this motion, the
Attorney General dismissed Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Davis as
dicta, and distinguished the conditions of confinement in Illinois from
those Kennedy had described in his concurrence, noting in particular that
some Illinois prisoners in long-term isolation (locked into their cells for

66
See Westefer, 422 F.3d at 589 (noting that placement in supermax resulted in the almost
complete deprivation of “human contact,” attorneys included.).
67
Amy Fettig, Tamms “Supermax” Prison with Its Inhumane and Ridiculously Expensive Solitary
Confinement Practices, Is Officially a Thing of the Past!, ACLU BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/tamms-supermax-prison-its-inhumane-and-ridiculously-expensive-solitary-c
onfinement-practices?redirect=blog/prisoners-rights/tamms-supermax-prison-its-inhumane-and-ridicul
ously-expensive-solitary [https://perma.cc/8V2X-Y7HH].
68
Jamey Dunn, DOC Still Working Out Policy for Former Tamms Prisoners, ILL. ISSUES BLOG
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://illinoisissuesblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/doc-still-working-out-policy-for-former.
html [https://perma.cc/E3YL-U4T5].
69
Class Action Complaint, supra note 60, at 9; id. at Exhibit A, ECF No. 1-2.
70
Id. at 16.
71
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 18, 2015), ECF No. 24.
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twenty-three or more hours per day ) have cellmates and, therefore, are
not in “solitary confinement.”73 These kinds of negotiations over both the
labels used to describe conditions of confinement, and the specific details
of conditions—how many hours prisoners have outside of their cells or
how much contact they have with medical professionals, for instance—
reveal how much control prison officials have not only over the conditions
of prisoners’ lives, but over how these conditions are described and
interpreted in legal documents.
On February 11, 2016, Judge Zagel dismissed the Coleman Complaint
without prejudice.74 The court found that the plaintiffs’ conditions did not
“amount to ‘extreme isolation,’” did not constitute “disproportionate
punishment,” and that none of the conditions were severe enough to trigger
either a “liberty interest” or the associated due process rights.75 In reaching
this finding, the court relied primarily on the precedent of Wilkinson v.
Austin, the one Supreme Court case to consider the constitutionality of
long-term solitary confinement, and the same case Justice Kennedy himself
referenced in his Ayala concurrence. Once again, a claim seemingly
responsive to Justice Kennedy’s invitation to present a case challenging
solitary confinement, was dismissed.
The Coleman plaintiffs deployed a multi-method litigation approach,
gathering data not just from prisoner plaintiffs, but from an array of
independent experts, and building on the momentum of the public
campaign to close Tamms. But these prisoner plaintiffs faced exactly the
issues that have plagued earlier attempts to reform solitary confinement:
the persistence of solitary confinement even in the face of reform efforts,
the opacity of solitary confinement units, and the broad administrative
discretion governing the practice.
IV. CALIFORNIA PRISONERS PROPOSE “WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES”
In California, a few months after the Coleman case was filed in
Illinois, prison officials agreed to settle a six-year-old, class action case:
Ashker v. Brown.76 Just as in the Coleman case, Ashker raised challenges to
72

Class Action Complaint, supra note 60, at 2.
Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4, Coleman v.
Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2016), ECF No. 24.
74
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 8–9, Coleman v. Taylor, No. 1:15-cv-05596 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
11, 2016), ECF No. 29. The plaintiffs, however, are planning to file an amended complaint, so the case
remains technically pending as of May 2016. E-mail from lead counsel, Alan Mills, to author (Apr. 13,
2016) (on file with author).
75
Id. at 5–8.
76
Summary of Settlement Terms in Ashker v. Brown (Governor of California), PRISONER
HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Sept. 9, 2015), https://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/
2015/09/09/summary-of-settlement-terms-in-ashker-v-brown-governor-of-california/ [https://perma.cc/
Y3ZF-96GR].
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both the conditions of solitary confinement and the procedures by which
prison officials assign prisoners to these conditions. The Ashker case,
however, survived motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and
entered settlement negotiations. On August 31, 2015, California prison
officials agreed to settle.77 An analysis of this case again reveals both the
critical role of multi-method litigation approaches and the potential
implementation challenges in the face of the opaque and discretionary
practices governing the persistent and ongoing use of solitary confinement.
Two prisoners, Todd Ashker and Danny Troxell, initiated Ashker v.
Brown, pro se, in 2009.78 The initial motions in the case attracted little
attention. Then, between 2011 and 2013, Ashker and Troxell, along with a
few dozen others in long-term solitary confinement in California’s
supermax, the Pelican Bay State Prison Security Housing Unit (SHU), led
three separate hunger strikes to protest both the harsh conditions of their
confinement and the administrative process by which prison officials had
assigned them to these conditions. The strike essentially amplified the
claims in the Ashker lawsuit.79
To coordinate the hunger strikes, prisoners set aside racial divisions
and collaborated across previously mortally divisive gang rivalries.80 Each
of the hunger strike leaders, including Ashker and Troxell, was serving an
indefinite term in isolation as a “validated” gang member.81 In California at
the time, three pieces of evidence, like a tattoo, being in possession of
“revolutionary” literature, or having a note from another validated gang
member, could result in validation as a gang member and assignment to
isolation for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence.82 In August 2011, during
the first hunger strike, prison officials released the first ever snapshot data
about how many prisoners had been in the Pelican Bay SHU and for how
long: more than 500 had been in total isolation for more than ten years.83
After the first hunger strike, a team of civil rights counsel (including
77

Settlement Agreement, supra note 4.
Ashker v. Governor of California, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS. (May 30, 2012), http://ccrjustice
.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/ashker-v-brown [https://perma.cc/LMM6-385B].
79
Prisoners’ Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Apr. 3, 2011), https://prisoner
hungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/the-prisoners-demands-2/ [https://perma.cc/2GRN-AUPR].
80
For a discussion of the institutionalized racism endemic within the California prison system, see
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513–14 (2005); Phil Goodman, “It’s Just Black, White, or
Hispanic”: An Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California’s Segregated Prison Reception
Centers”, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 735–37 (2008).
81
Anthony Skeens, Inside the SHU Part 1: Isolation, DEL NORTE TRIPLICATE (June 24, 2013),
http://www.triplicate.com/News/Local-News/Inside-the-SHU-Part-1-isolation [http://web.archive.org/
web/20160529064235/http://www.triplicate.com/News/Local-News/Inside-the-SHU-Part-1-isolation].
82
For a discussion of the validation policy then in place, see Reiter, supra note 46, at 542.
83
Julie Small, Under Scrutiny, Pelican Bay Prison Officials Say They Target Only Gang Leaders,
S. CAL. PUB. RADIO BROADCAST (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/08/23/28382/pelican
-bay-prison-officials-say-they-lock-gang-bo/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20131001033957/http://www
.scpr.org/news/2011/08/23/28382/pelican-bay-prison-officials-say-they-lock-gang-bo/].
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Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, based in San Francisco, and the
Center for Constitutional Rights, based in New York City) joined the
prisoners’ case. In May 2013, the legal team sought to certify the class of
500 people who had been in isolation in the Pelican Bay SHU for ten years
or more.84 In June 2014, the federal district court judge overseeing the case
certified the class. Between the filing of the motion for class certification
and the actual certification, in August 2013, the prisoners led a third
hunger strike that involved 30,000 prisoners; some refused food for sixty
days. Each hunger strike attracted national and international attention—and
escalating condemnation.85
Between 2011 and 2014, during the hunger strikes and ongoing Ashker
litigation, prison officials sought to maintain their control over isolation in
California. First, even though the Ashker plaintiffs used non-violent tools
(hunger strikes and litigation) to seek reform, prison officials characterized
them as “convicted murderers who are putting lives at risk to advance their
own agenda of violence” both in affidavits filed in Ashker and in public
commentaries in state newspapers.86 Second, prison officials initiated “preemptive, but superficial reforms” to the policies by which prisoners were
validated as gang members and assigned to indefinite terms in solitary
confinement.87 (As in Illinois, isolation policies in the Pelican Bay
supermax had already been litigated, and prison officials had already
secured the right to maintain at least some prisoners in long-term
isolation.88) Prison officials even transferred eight of the ten named
plaintiffs in the Ashker litigation out of the Pelican Bay SHU, in an
apparent effort to moot the class. The judge overseeing the case issued an
order expanding the class to include prisoners anywhere in the state who

84
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion & Motion for Class Certification; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 15, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013), https://ccrjust
ice.org/sites/default/files/assets/195%20Motion%20for%20Class%20Certification.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3L6V-CCWJ].
85
See generally Reiter, supra note 16, at 603 (“[T]he [third] strike played a critical role in
drawing local, national, and international attention to the practice of long-term solitary confinement in
the United States . . . [which] led to concrete changes in the prisoners’ conditions of
confinement . . . .”).
86
Jeffrey Beard, Hunger Strike in California Prisons Is a Gang Power Play, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/06/opinion/la-oe-beard-prison-hunger-strike-20130806 [htt
ps://perma.cc/BXS7-HWKY].
87
Id.; Keramet Reiter, (Un)Settling Solitary Confinement in California’s Prisons, SOC. JUST.
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/?p=3214 [http://web.archive.org/web/2016022209
1137/http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/unsettling-solitary-confinement-in-californias-prisons/].
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had spent ten or more years in isolation.
In August of 2015, the prisoner plaintiffs filed ten comprehensive (and
extremely critical) expert reports documenting the myriad detrimental
impacts—from legal, psychological, and medical perspectives—of longterm solitary confinement.90 Just a few weeks later, the parties announced a
settlement in the case.
The provisions of the settlement represented drastic changes to both
the conditions in and policies governing solitary confinement in California.
Prison officials agreed to assign only prisoners who break specific inprison rules to solitary confinement and to a hard cap of five years on any
term in solitary confinement. This eliminated both the policy of validating
gang members based on three pieces of evidence of gang association and
the policy of assigning these validated gang members to solitary
confinement indefinitely.91 The settlement applied retroactively: all
prisoners who had spent more than five years in solitary confinement
(including all the Ashker class members) would be moved into the general
prison population within one year. And officials agreed to collect data
about the characteristics of populations in solitary confinement over the
subsequent two years and to provide this data to plaintiffs’ attorneys, to aid
in the monitoring of the settlement.92
The combination of coordinated public action by the hunger striking
prisoners; the data about California’s solitary confinement practices, which
the media requested and published during those hunger strikes; and the
assembling of experts to produce reports all contributed to a multi-method
litigation strategy. This strategy mobilized much more than straightforward
legal arguments to pressure the state to change its solitary confinement
policies; outside of the courts, state prison officials faced persistent and
harsh public condemnation.
However, the resistance of state officials, from the way they
characterized prisoner plaintiffs as advancing agendas of violence
throughout the litigation to their attempts to moot the Ashker class by
moving prisoners out of the Pelican Bay SHU, suggests a high potential for
resistance to implementation of the Ashker settlement. After all, long-term
solitary confinement has been in use in California, as in Illinois, since the
1970s, in spite of years of litigation and multiple attempts at reform. In
sum, the progress of the Ashker case over six years of litigation, and the
89
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settlement to which prisoners and prison officials ultimately agreed,
reveals not only the importance of multi-method approaches to challenges
to solitary confinement, but also the ongoing persistence of solitary
confinement as a largely invisible practice, primarily controlled by prison
officials.
V. LOST LESSONS
Too many of the attempts to reform U.S. prison conditions generally
and solitary confinement specifically ignore two lessons of history. First,
solitary confinement has existed in U.S. prisons since the very first
penitentiaries opened in Pennsylvania and New York in the 1820s.93
Though the Supreme Court condemned solitary confinement in 1890 as a
“further terror [beyond a sentence of death] and peculiar mark of infamy”
(as Justice Kennedy noted in his Davis concurrence), the practice
continued.94 In the 1970s, every major case challenging state and federal
prison conditions—and there were hundreds of such cases at the peak of
the civil rights movement—condemned the dark, dirty, abusive, sometimes
even crowded conditions in isolation.95 Courts ordered improvements to
these conditions of confinement: less dirt, more light and air.96 In the 1990s
and 2000s in Madrid in California and Westefer in Illinois, courts ordered
further improvements to these conditions of confinement: better policies
and more procedures governing placement in isolation. Still, the practice of
solitary confinement continued. In light of this continuity, current efforts to
refine, reform, and develop alternatives to solitary confinement may be
limited in their long-term impact, absent more explicit initiatives to restrict
the number of people in solitary confinement, or even to abolish the
practice entirely.
Second, litigation has provided one mechanism for oversight of
solitary confinement, and has also forced moments of transparency,
revealing the abuses that can take place deep inside the prisons within
prisons of solitary confinement.97 But litigation has also been a force for
perfecting solitary confinement. Following the improvements to solitary
confinement ordered in the 1970s, the practice continued to be used, albeit
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in a cleaner, brighter, and less crowded form. In 1995, considering one of
the first challenges to modern, hygienic supermax facilities like the Pelican
Bay SHU, Judge Thelton Henderson of the Northern district court of
California said the conditions pushed the boundaries of the humanly
tolerable, and ordered that at least the mentally ill should be uniformly
excluded from such conditions of confinement.99 And yet, twenty years
later, across the United States, states are still defending the placement of
the mentally ill in solitary confinement, as evidenced by the complaint in
Coleman in Illinois.
No matter how strong the case, how solid the evidence, and how firmly
Justice Kennedy condemns the practice of solitary confinement, neither
Kennedy nor the Supreme Court can single-handedly wipe out our national
tradition of solitary confinement. Actual elimination (or even reductions)
of solitary confinement will require concerted effort to incorporate critics,
intellectual experts, and especially the prison officials who manage
overcrowded and dangerous prisons day in and day out, in designing real
alternatives, subject to consistent and persistent oversight.
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